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Abstract: Anxiety disorders cause mental distress and low wellbeing in many people worldwide.
Theories of anxiety describe negative worldviews and self-views as maintaining factors of the disor-
ders. Recent research in social cognition has found a link between depression and altered perceptual
biases to emotions, but the same research on anxiety is still missing. In this study, we measured
perceptual biases to emotional and self-related stimuli in sub-clinically anxious participants and
healthy controls using a self-emotional shape-label matching task. Results demonstrate that anxious
participants had a diminished perceptual self-bias compared with healthy controls. Furthermore,
the severity of anxiety was related to an emotional bias towards valanced other-related stimuli. The
findings confirm the hypothesis that anxious individuals display an altered self-prioritisation effect
in comparison with healthy individuals and that anxiety severity is linked to altered responses to
emotionally valanced others. These findings have potential implications for early diagnosis and
treatment of anxiety disorders.
Keywords: anxiety; mental health; self-prioritisation effect; positivity bias
1. Introduction
Anxiety disorders are some of the most common mental health issues. Between
13% and 33.7% of people in the Western world experience anxiety at some point in their
lifetime [1]. Anxiety disorders are characterised by persistent, excessive, and debilitating
fear and worry over time, but the manifestation of anxiety can vary from person to person.
Common physical symptoms are trembling, increased heartrate, nausea, restlessness, and
headaches. Psychological symptoms include feeling tense and nervous, a sense of doom,
uncontrollable worrying, and ruminating. The main behavioural symptom is avoiding
anxiety-triggering situations [2]. Anxiety can have detrimental consequences, including
issues with maintaining relationships, meeting new people, keeping a job, and enjoying
life. Treatments of anxiety disorders include various forms of therapies and medications
which successfully alleviate symptoms in around 6 out of 10 people [3].
Current research on mental health has found links between mood disorders and
perceptual processes [4–7], but research into anxiety and self-perception is still lacking.
Anxiety is theorised to be linked to an altered view of oneself and the world [8–12], where
the anxious individual focusses excessively on threats and dangers. The theory applies
to various disorders such as social anxiety and phobias, but the present study focused
on generalised anxiety disorder, which is often measured due to the overlap with other
anxiety and depression disorders [3]. The aim of the current study was to understand the
psychological mechanisms of anxiety in the non-clinical population by using cognitive
tasks to measure perception of the self and emotions. Here, we specifically focussed on
two perceptual biases: the self-prioritisation effect and the positivity bias.
The self-prioritisation effect, a strong bias towards self-related stimuli, is a robust
finding in cognitive psychology [13–15]. Dichotic hearing tasks are the classic way to
Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2021, 18, 12096. https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph182212096 https://www.mdpi.com/journal/ijerph
Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2021, 18, 12096 2 of 14
test the self-prioritisation effect [13,16]. In the task, participants focus on the input in
one ear, while ignoring the input from the other ear. The input most frequently noticed
in the ignored ear is the mentioning of the participant’s own name. Memory tests can
also measure a self-prioritisation effect; for example, people remember more items from
their “own shopping basket” than from a stranger’s [17]. The mechanisms underpinning
self-prioritisation are still controversial, and noteworthy attempts to explain the effect have
relied on everything from attention over memory to perception [4,6,7]. In the current study,
we investigated the self-prioritisation effect in implicit, visual perception.
An experimental paradigm has recently been developed in cognitive psychology and
neuroscience to capture differences in various aspects of the self [18–20]. In the shape-label
perceptual matching paradigm, participants are shown a shape (e.g., circle) and are told
that this specific shape represents themselves, while other shapes represent other people
(e.g., a friend or a stranger). The task is to judge whether the shape is presented with the
matching label as quickly and accurately as possible. People are quicker and more accurate
to identify whether a shape-label pair matches when the pairing represents themselves.
Even though the task does not require conscious self-perception, the self-prioritisation effect
is still present. This shows that most people have an implicit perceptual bias that makes
them prioritise processing of self-relevant information in the environment around them.
In addition, the positivity bias, a preference towards positive stimuli, is also common in
healthy people. People naturally pay more attention to emotional stimuli, especially when
positive and relevant to self-preservation [21–23], but also when the stimuli are negative
and arousing [4]. People tend to remember positive memories more frequently and better
than neutral or negative memories. The positivity bias can also be measured using the
shape-label matching paradigm. Stolte et al. (2017) [24] and McIvor et al. (2020) [4]
adjusted the perceptual matching task so that each shape was presented with an emotional
expression. The healthy control group in both studies replied faster and more accurately
on trials with positive expressions than they did to neutral or negative expressions. There
was also improved performance on trials with negative expressions compared with the
neutral ones. People usually focus more on emotional stimuli, especially when the stimuli
are positive.
The underlying mechanisms of the self-prioritisation effect and the positivity bias
are still debated. One possibility is that the two biases are underpinned by the same
neural substrate, the medial prefrontal cortex [25]. A combined self-positivity bias can
be tested using a shape-label matching task which distinguishes between “good” and
“bad” in addition to “self” and “other” [26]. Healthy people respond most efficiently to the
shape that represents their good self. Similarly, the self-prioritisation effect is boosted in a
positive-self connection and dampened in a negative-self connection [22], suggesting that
humans generally seek a positive view on themselves and the world. However, Schäfer
and Frings (2019) [27] were unable to find a link between self-esteem and self-prioritisation,
showing that the connection between positivity and self is not detangled just yet.
People with mental disorders might categorically divert from the common perceptual
biases towards positivity and the self. As an example, depression weakens the positivity
and negativity biases [4]. In a shape-label matching task paired with happy, neutral, and
sad facial expressions, healthy controls showed strong positivity and self-biases and a small
negativity bias. Depressed participants had a normal self-bias but a reduced bias towards
positive or negative stimuli, leaving them insensitive to emotional biases. This indicates
that depression is characterised by an indifference to emotional input, which might be
causing, maintaining, or worsening the disorder. Depression and anxiety are co-morbid
and often occur together. The present study explored whether anxiety is also linked to
divergent perceptual biases.
Previous research has found links between explicit negativity bias and anxiety. Kalen-
zaga and Jouhaud (2018) [28] found that socially anxious participants remembered as many
self-relevant and positive words as controls. However, when the participants were asked
to “remember” instead of “guess” words on the list, the positivity bias disappeared in
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anxious participants. Adding a need for certainty meant that the anxious participants had
reduced positivity bias. Muranaka and Sasaki (2018) [6] tested word generation in social
anxiety. Participants had to come up with words to describe a negative and embarrassing
social situation. The socially anxious participants engaged in more negative and dysfunc-
tional self-rumination than controls. They generated more negative words overall and
even more negative self-related words than non-anxious people. The converging evidence
indicates that anxiety (specifically social anxiety) can reduce the positivity bias and the
self-prioritisation effect in memory. However, whether the reduction extends to implicit
biases is yet to be explored.
To investigate how anxiety, the self-prioritisation effect, and the positivity bias are
related in perceptual processes, we must draw from theories on cognition and perception
in anxiety disorders. Cognitive and attentional theories describe a threat-related bias
which gives anxious people a larger attentional bias towards threats compared with non-
anxious people [29,30]. The theory is supported by the Information-Processing Model of
Anxiety [9,10], according to which anxious individuals have heightened threat detection,
meaning that they are more likely to perceive threats even when there are none. As a
result, they are more likely to activate an automatic threat response and later to consciously
reflect and ruminate on the threatening situation. The theory has a foundation in findings
from attention tasks which show that anxious people engage more with and reply quicker
to threatening input and situations [31–34], as well as evidence of threatening stimuli
distracting anxious people from performing well [35]. Given the heightened focus on
threats, anxious individuals might show reduced positivity bias.
Anxiety is also characterised by an altered self-view [8,11,12], which often takes the
form of enhanced negative self-focus. Anxious individuals ruminate on their past and
future experiences. Since this rumination is dysfunctional and focusses excessively on
negative experiences, anxious people often have distorted evaluations of themselves which
in turn can lead to decreased self-esteem. Anxious people are more likely to remember self-
threatening information which challenges a positive self-view, whereas healthy people for-
get self-threatening information to preserve their self-image [31]. The changes in how anx-
ious individuals view themselves could be linked to a divergent self-prioritisation effect.
On the technical level, it is vital to test changes in biases using both explicit and
implicit tasks because anxiety is a disorder in which these processes may differ. Here, we
focus on the implicit biases, using the self-emotional shape-label matching task that allows
manipulating personal associations and emotions on the implicit level. Thus, the current
study measured both the self-prioritisation effect, the positivity bias, and the intercept
between the two under the same metric. It is also important to make a distinction between
(1) the differences in perceptual biases between anxious and non-anxious individuals and
(2) the relationship between perceptual biases and anxiety severity within the anxious
population. For this reason, we investigated both the group differences and the trends on
the individual level. Lastly, we measured generalised anxiety disorder to investigate how
symptoms of worrying and ruminating are linked with self- and emotional biases, unlike
previous memory studies [6,28] that focused on social anxiety and the perceived emotions
of others.
Overall, from the previous studies, e.g., [4,18,29–31], we predicted that:
1. Self-positivity would be diminished in the anxious group. If this were true, it would
be reflected in slower and less accurate responses to self-related and positive stimuli
in the anxious group;
2. Self-positivity would be related to the severity of anxiety, although the nature of this
relation could not be predicted based on the current knowledge. This hypothesis
would be supported if faster or slower responses to self-related or emotional stimuli
could predict anxiety levels.
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2. Materials and Methods
2.1. Participants
No a priori power analyses were performed to determine sample size given that
this experiment was conducted as a pilot study. For clinical trials, a sample size between
25 and 50 is considered reasonable [36]. The sample size was set to 42 in each group
to allow for full stimuli counterbalancing. Eighty-four undergraduate students from a
British university participated in the experiment in exchange for course credits. A total
of 13 participants identified as men, 70 as women, and one as a different gender, with
the mean age of 21.24 years old (SD = 4.09, range from 18–51). Half the participants were
randomly assigned to the shape-label matching task with “self” and “friend” labels and
the other half with “self” and “stranger” labels. Participants were recruited through the
online recruitment system of the psychology department. The study was approved by the
School of Psychology’s Ethics Committee (protocol code PEC/4535/2020/8 and date of
approval 6 October 2020).
2.2. Stimuli
A vertical and horizontal outline of an oval were randomly associated with the self
and friend or stranger. The shape contained three lines that formed a happy face, a neutral
face, a sad face, or three vertical lines (see Figure 1). A white fixation cross was displayed
in the centre of the screen (50%, 50%). Shapes were presented above the fixation cross (50%,
35%) and white labels were presented below the fixation cross (50%, 65%). All stimuli
were shown against a grey background. The experiment was conducted online through
Inquisit [37].
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2.3. Procedure and Measures
2.3.1. Self-Emotio al Shape-Label Matching Task
The self-biases were me sured using the perceptual self-emotional shape-label match-
ing task. The participant was told that each shape (vertical oval or horizontal oval) rep-
resented a person—themselves and their friend or a stranger. To make the friend and
stranger as concrete as the self, the participant named them prior to the experiment. The
task was to judge if the presented hap -l bel pairing corresp nded with the previously
learned association. The participants were told that the lines were irrelevant to the task.
Each trial had four stages (see Figure 2). First, a blank screen with a fixation point was
present for 500 ms. Next, the stimuli were shown for 150 ms and consisted of a shape above
the fixation point and a word below it: “You”, “Friend”, and “Stranger”. A blank screen
was then s own w ile the participant indicated wh ther the hape and word matched one
of the learned associations. This screen was present until the participant answered or the
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reaction time surpassed 1500 ms. The last screen provided feedback by stating “Correct”,
“Incorrect”, or “Too slow” for 500 ms.
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Figure 2. Flow chart of the perceptual shape-label matching task.
There were three short practice blocks (eight demo trials, eight self-paced practice
trials, and six r al-time practice trials). In the demo trial , the s ape-lab l pair remained on
the screen with instructions until a r sponse was made. The instruction indicated whether
the pair was a match or not and the response key needed (i.e., “MATCH! So, you’d press
‘v’ with the index finger of your left hand”; or “NOT A MATCH! So, you’d press ‘b’ with
the index finger of your right hand. Remember this shape matched with . . . ”). In the
self-paced practice trials the shape-label pair remained on screen until a response was
made, but no instruction was provided. The real-time practi e trials were identical to the
experimental trials.
The formal experiment contained four blocks. Each of the four formal blocks contained
80 trials, giving 320 experimental trials in total. There were 24 distinct combinations of
conditions (Person: self, friend or stranger; Emotion: happy, line, neutral, sad; Matching:
match, mismatch). Each participant was exposed to 16 conditions, as one half completed
the friend cond tions, while the othe completed the stranger conditions (see Table 1).
The entire shape-label matching task including practice trials took approximately 15 min
to complete. This version of the task was shorter and easier than the original lab-based
shape-label matching task to accommodate for participants doing it online using their own
computer [38].
Table 1. Overview of the trials in each of the participant groups and conditions.
Match Mismatch
Happy Neutral Sad Line Happy Neutral Sad Line
Self-friend group 1 Self 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
Friend * 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
Self-stranger group 2 Self 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
Stranger * 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
Note: 1: N = 42, 2: N = 42, *: Data merged into one “other” category.
2.3.2. Anxiety
Participants’ anxiety levels were measured with the Generalised Anxiety Disorder
questionnaire (GAD-7) [39]. GAD-7 consists of 7 symptoms that measure generalised
anxiety in the past two weeks. Participants were asked to rate how often they had expe-
rienced each symptom over the last two weeks, which gives a long-term picture of their
anxiety severity. Symptoms were rated from 0 (not at all) to 3 (nearly every day). The sum
of all 7 answers placed participants in one of th following categories: minimal anxiety
(0–4), mild anxiety (5–9), moderate anxiety (10–14), and severe anxiety (15–21). Partici-
pants were evenly spread across the GAD-7 spectrum (see Figure 3). We used continuous
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scores in the regression analyses and a division at 5 in the analyses of variance (ANOVA)
(<5 = non-anxious group, ≥5 = anxious group). The cut-off score at 5 ensured a reliable
distinction between healthy individuals and people with subclinical anxiety [40,41]; the
latter suggests cut-off at 6. The internal reliability of GAD-7 in this study was Cronbach’s
α = 0.894. As GAD is highly co-morbid not only with other anxiety disorders but also with
depression disorders, depressive symptoms were measured as a control factor using the
Beck Depression Inventory, BDI-II (see footnote in Table 2).
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Table 2. Correlations between age, depression, anxiety, and reaction times to emotional self- and other-related stimuli in the
anxious group.
Variables M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Outcome variable
1. GAD 11.1 4.49 —
Control variable
2. Age 20.9 2.55 −0.14 —
3. BDI 1 19.2 10.83 0.47 *** −0.15
Predictor variables —
4. Happy face, self-shape RTs 694.5 86.5 −0.10 0.07 −0.16 —
5. Neutral face, self-shape RTs 706.7 99.46 −0.11 0.15 −0.11 0.73 *** —
6. Sad face, self-shape RTs 715.1 92.49 0.06 0.02 −0.02 0.72 *** 0.64 *** —
7. Happy face, other-shape RTs 723 109.91 −0.09 −0.04 −0.07 0.52 *** 0.55 *** 0.40 ** —
8. Neutral face, other-shape RTs 720.2 105.13 0.02 −0.03 −0.13 0.51 *** 0.45 *** 0.41 *** 0.81 ***
9. Sad face, other-shape RTs 740.4 108.64 0.18 −0.27 * −0.00 0.47 *** 0.36 ** 0.41 *** 0.75 *** 0.81 ***
Note. N = 60; M: mean; SD: standard deviation; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 (two-tailed tests). 1: Depression is a confounding variable
which influences emotion perception [4]. It was measured with the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI-II) [42], which has 21 items with
four statements each. Each statement has a rating of 0 (symptom not present) to 3 (severe symptom). Total scores < 9 = no depression,
10–18 = mild–moderate depression, 19–29 = moderate–severe depression, and > 30 = severe depression. The suicidal thoughts or wishes
inventory was removed to avoid distress. The internal reliability was measured as high (Cronbach’s α = 0.925).
2.4. Data Analysis
All 84 participants were included in the group-level analysis. The respective responses
to “friend” and “stranger” were merged into the same variable named “other” since there
were neither main effects of the self-friend and self-stranger biases nor interactions with
emotional biases (see Appendix A, Table A1). By merging the two groups into one, the
statistical tests gained more power, and the number of violated statistical assumptions was
lowered, while the analysis could still detect self-biases. The emotional conditions were
compared with the control condition, showing that the three vertical lines and sad expres-
sions elicited very similar performance, while the neutral and happy stimuli facilitated
better performance (see Appendix A, Table A2).
Implicit self-bias was measured by comparing self-related trials with other-related
(friend/stranger) trials on reaction time and response accuracy. We measured biases
towards emotional stimuli by comparing response time and accuracy with the happy,
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line, neutral, and sad stimuli. In addition, we used the emotion responses to measure a
combination of self- and emotion-bias e.g., the self-positivity bias.
2.4.1. Are the Self-Bias and Positivity Bias Weakened in the Anxious Group Compared
with Controls?
ANOVAs were run to explore the groupwise effects of anxiety on self-biases. We
conducted repeated-measures ANOVA (rmANOVA) on response accuracy and reaction
time with the two within-subjects variables, emotion (Happy × Line × Neutral × Sad)
and person (Self × Other), and with anxiety (non-anxious vs. anxious) as the between-
subjects variable.
2.4.2. What Are the Individual Differences in Self-Bias, Positivity Bias, and Severity
of Anxiety?
The regression analysis was used to better understand the relationship between
reaction times and anxiety in anxious individuals. We applied a hierarchical regression
analysis between anxiety score and reaction times in the anxiety group (GAD ≥ 5). We used
the reaction times in the regression analysis because they were similar to but more sensitive
than the accuracy scores. The reaction times to sad, neutral, and happy expressions were
used to create three models predicting the severity of anxiety. The first step accounted for
age and depression, the second step accounted for age, depression, and response times
to self-related stimuli, and the third step accounted for age, depression, and the response
times to both self- and other-related stimuli (an overview of the steps is presented in Table 3
in the Section 3).
Table 3. Hierarchical multiple regression models for reaction time to facial expressions predicting GAD in the anxious group.
Predictors R2 ∆R2 B Beta t
Step 1 0.23
Age −0.12 −0.05 −0.57
BDI 0.19 0.46 3.92 ***
Step 2 0.25 0.02
Age −0.08 −0.05 −0.40
BDI 0.18 0.44 3.64 ***
Happy face, self-shape RTs −0.00 −0.07 −0.37
Neutral face, self-shape RTs −0.01 −0.14 −0.79
Sad face, self-shape RTs 0.01 0.21 1.20
Step 3 0.36 0.11 *
Age 0.10 0.06 0.45
BDI 0.18 0.44 3.71 ***
Happy face, self-shape RTs −0.01 −0.15 −0.74
Neutral face, self-shape RTs 0.00 0.00 0.01
Sad face, self-shape RTs 0.01 0.12 0.70
Happy face, other-shape RTs −0.02 −0.48 −2.24 *
Neutral face, other-shape RTs 0.00 0.08 0.34
Sad face, other-shape RTs 0.02 0.51 2.24 *
Note. N = 60; * p < 0.05, *** p < 0.001. B denotes unstandardized coefficients and Beta denotes standardized coefficients.
3. Results
3.1. Are the Self-Bias and Positivity Bias Weakened in the Anxious Group Compared
with Controls?
The ANOVAs on accuracy showed strong support for the main effect of person (self
vs. other), F(1,82) = 15.01, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.053, BF10 = 6.83 × 1011. More accurate responses
were made to the self-related stimuli (0.84 ± 0.13) than other-related stimuli (0.76 ± 0.15).
No evidence was found for the main effect of emotion (F(3,246) = 0.39, p = 0.76, η2 = 0,
BF10 = 0.01) or for the main effect of anxiety, F(1,82) = 0.78, p = 0.38, η2 = 0.004, BF10 = 0.30.
Additionally, no significant effect of interactions were observed, either for Person × Anxi-
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ety (F(1,82) = 0.47, p = 0.493, η2 = 0.002, BF10 = 0.17), Emotion × Anxiety (F(3,246) = 0.17,
p = 0.915, η2 = 0, BF10 = 1.13 × 10−4), Emotion × Person (F(3,246) = 0.46, p = 0.712,
η2 = 0.001, BF10 = 3.87 × 10−4), or Emotion × Person × Anxiety (F(3,246) = 0.24, p = 0.869,
η2 = 0, BF10 = 1.79 × 10−7). Participants performed more accurately on self-related trials,
but there were no other significant main effects or interaction effects of accuracy.
The ANOVA on reaction times revealed strong evidence for the main effect of person,
F(1,82) = 24.52, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.05, BF10 = 1.92 × 1010. There were faster response times
to self-related stimuli (699 ± 83.3) than to other-related stimuli (738 ± 99.2). No evidence
for the main effect of emotion, F(3,246) = 3.68, p = 0.013, η2 = 0.004, BF10 = 0.24, or for the
group effect of anxiety was found, F(1,82) = 0.08, p = 0.776, η2 = 0.001, BF10 = 0.31.
The evidence for the interaction between person and anxiety group was strong,
F(1,82) = 8.45, p = 0.005, η2 = 0.018, BF10 = 81846. Follow-up analysis showed strong
evidence that the reaction times to self-related stimuli were faster than to other-related
stimuli in the non-anxious group, (mean ± std: 669.48 ± 98.8 vs. 754 ± 110, t(82) = −4.04,
p < 0.001, Cohen’s dz = 0.81, 95% CI (0.51, 1.11), BF10 = 89371), while the evidence of the
effect in the anxious group was inconclusive, (mean ± std: 706 ± 92.9 vs. 728 ± 108,
t(82) = 1.95, p = 0.214, Cohen’s dz = 0.22, 95% CI (0.04, 0.40), BF10 = 1.66) (See Figure 4). In
sum, participants scoring low on the anxiety scale responded quicker to self-related stimuli
than other-related stimuli, but this effect was not found in participants scoring ≥ 5 on
the GAD-7.
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There were no interactions in reaction times between Emotion × Anxiety (F(3,246) = 0.57,
p = 0.632, η2 = 0.001, BF10 = 0.01), Emotion × Person (F(3,246) = 1.84, p = 0.141, η2 = 0.002,
BF10 = 0.01), or Emotion × Person × Anxiety (F(3,246) = 0.10, p = 0.394, η2 = 0.001,
BF10 = 2.21 × 10−4).
3.2. What Are the Individual Differences in Self-Bias, Positivity Bias, and Severity of Anxiety?
Table 2 displays the means, standard deviations, and correlations for all study variables
in the anxious group. As Table 3 shows, depression is a strong predictor of anxiety,
F(2,57) = 8.38, p < 0.001, R2 = 0.23. Reaction times to all self-related stimuli failed to predict
anxiety in step 2 (F(5,54) = 3.62, p = 0.007, R2 = 0.25). Importantly, after adding all predictors
including control factors, step 3 was significant, F(8,51) = 3.56, p = 0.002, R2 = 0.36. Reaction
times to other-happy stimuli was negatively correlated with anxiety (β = −0.48, p = 0.03).
Reaction times to other-sad stimuli was a positive predictor of anxiety (β = 0.51, p = 0.029).
In sum, the results show that in anxious individuals, faster responses to happy other-related
stimuli and slower responses to sad other-related stimuli predicted more severe anxiety
(see Figure 5).
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4. Discussion
The current study aimed to examine implicit perceptual self- and positivity biases
in sub-clinical anxiety and healthy controls. The results strongly support that the self-
prior tisation eff ct is weakened in people with mild-to-severe anxiety comp red with
healthy controls. Within the anxious group, quicker responses to others with happy
expressions and slower responses to others with sad expressions predicted increased
severity of anxiety. The data indicate that the self-prioritisation effect was altered in
anxious individuals in comparison with healthy controls and that the positivity bias was
altered with increasing severity of anxiety.
We predicted that the sub-clinically anxious group would display a weakened self-
prioritisation effect and positivity bias compared with healthy people based on current
knowledge of similar self-prioritising processes in memory and attention [3,6,28]. The
esults sh w that the anxious group did n t have a significant self- ri ritisation effect,
while the healthy group did, supporting the predict on and p evious li erature [4,8,11,12].
However, the group-level results did not find any links between anxiety and an altered
positivity bias. In tasks that measure conscious cognition (e.g., memory tasks), anxiety is
generally linked to a decrease in self-positivity bias, meaning that anxious people remember
more negative self-related things and forget positive ones [6,28,31]. The current task
measured implicit perceptual processing of the self and emotions. The self-prioritisation
effect likely arose from implicit low-level information processes [15], but emotional biases
might be more conscious or connected to different processes, which could explain why
only a decrease in self-prioritisatio was linked with experiencing anxiety.
The severity of anxiety, on the other hand, connected to an increase in the perceptual
positivity bias. This answered our second question of how self-positivity was related to anx-
iety severity in the individual. Severe anxiety was related to improved performance on im-
plicit happy stimuli, and reduced performance on sad stimuli. The quick responses to posi-
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tive other-related input in highly anxious people can be explained using the Information-
Processing Model of Anxiety [9,10]. Meta-analyses by Bar-Haim et al. (2007) [29] and more
recently Günther et al. (2021) [30] concluded that anxious individuals have a small but
robust early attentional bias towards threat. Although no threatening stimuli were present
in this study, we found that emotional other-related faces were perceived differently by
people with high anxiety. Happy faces were processed quicker, while sad faces were
processed slower. It could be argued that happy faces were more arousing than sad faces,
and that these results mirrored that alerted people reply quicker to arousing stimuli [23]. In
this regard, it would be interesting to see how quickly anxious people perceive and process
angry or surprised faces, which are more arousing and indicative of threats than the happy
and sad faces used in this experiment. Alternatively, when an anxious individual implicitly
processes negative stimuli slower, it might be because sad other-related expressions distract
them from performing on the matching task. This interpretation would align with the
interference theory in attention research [35,43]. However, since the non-emotional control
stimuli and the sad expressions were highly comparable (see Appendix A, Table A2), it
seems more likely that emotional stimuli facilitated, rather than distracted from, perfor-
mance. In this light, severe anxiety was linked to happy faces improving performance
more than in mild anxiety and to sad faces not improving performance as much as in mild
anxiety. Either interpretation supports that perceptual and attentional biases could lead to
more negative memories, thoughts, and beliefs, thus explaining vital symptoms of anxiety
such as nervousness and worrying. These results demonstrate that the altered positivity
bias in anxious people extends into implicit low-level perceptual processing, which could
be a crucial factor for successful intervention.
Anxiety is coupled with low self-esteem and negative self-view [8,11,12] which might
relate to both the lack of self-prioritisation in anxious people and the emotional biases seen
in more severe experiences of anxiety. The hypothesised changes in self-positivity were not
directly supported by an interaction between self-prioritisation and emotional biases in the
group-level analysis. We found that anxious people generally processed self-related input
similar to other-related stimuli, which was different from the self-prioritisation effect in
controls. The self is considered a robust construct which is immune to many biases—for
example, the frequency-bias [44]—yet the self-prioritisation effect is eliminated in mental
disorders such as anxiety and depression [45]. On the individual level, anxious people with
severe anxiety perceived happy stimuli quicker and sad stimuli slower, but only for a shape
that was related to others. This effect might also be interpreted as the self being robust
and thus protected from the alteration in emotional biases, while the other-related stimuli
is processed in a biased way in individuals with more severe anxiety. Another possible
interpretation might be that anxious individuals perceive the other with greater esteem
following the severity of anxiety [46]. In sum, there was a deficiency of self-prioritisation
in anxiety coupled with altered emotional biases in more severe anxiety. One could assume
that anxiety causes or is partly caused by a decreased self-prioritisation effect, but the
change in perceptual positivity bias only occurs as the anxiety worsens. It certainly appears
that the two biases interact differently and separately with anxiety.
One merit of the study is that it provides new support of an altered self-view in anxiety
and suggests that using perceptual tasks to measure mental disorders may add helpful
contributions to precision psychiatry. The self-prioritisation effect plays a crucial role in
how we process information in the environment around us. According to the integrative
theory of self, we use the self to bind important information from our environment together
to form a comprehensive understanding of the world [47]. Humans have a bias towards
self-related stimuli because these stimuli are crucial for understanding the world. However,
as found in this study, people experiencing anxiety display altered self-prioritisation effects.
Therefore, anxious individuals might have difficulty processing the information that is
crucial for building a stable understanding of themselves and their environment. A lack of
perceptual self-prioritisation is a feature of anxiety, which could explain the dysfunctional
self-image and worldview characteristic of the disorder.
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The current study raises several points of interest for further investigations. First, it is
important to note that anxiety often co-occurs with depression and that people experienc-
ing severe anxiety often also have depressive symptoms. Although this possible confound
was controlled for in the current experiment, further work on the relations between the two
factors is needed. Second, given that we used the sum of the GAD score rather than con-
sidering heterogeneity in individual cases, in-depth analysis with a large anxious sample
would provide an informative way to assess individual variations of self-related deficits in
anxiety. Traditional classifications of mental disorders focus heavily on symptoms. This
form of classification is criticised for being too broad and for not always being helpful to
the affected individual. With new measures and research on the underlying mechanisms
of different disorders, it is becoming possible to individualise and personalise measure-
ment tools and treatments [48]. The perceptual shape-label matching paradigm, or an
adjusted version of it, could become an invaluable tool to clinicians and counsellors. If
the task can reliably capture divergences in the self-prioritisation effect and positivity bias
in anxiety, it can be used along with other clinical measures, providing a suitable and
personalised treatment to the individual. Finally, the current study was explorative in
nature and lacked a clear prediction from previous research. We found strong support of a
diminished self-prioritisation effect and altered biases to valanced stimuli in sub-clinically
anxious people. Future research should determine whether the same effects can be found
in clinical anxiety. Being the first study of its kind to our knowledge, it will be useful to
apply the self-emotional shape-label matching paradigm to future studies of anxiety with
directional hypotheses.
5. Conclusions
This pilot study measured implicit perceptual biases to the self and emotional stimuli
in anxious and non-anxious participants. The results show that the self-prioritisation effect
was diminished in anxious individuals compared with healthy controls, and that an in-
crease in other-related positivity bias predicted more severe anxiety in anxious individuals.
The lack of self-prioritisation and the focus on positivity in others but not the self can be
partially explained by the information-processing theory of anxiety. The findings highlight
that implicit perceptual processes contribute to anxiety.
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Appendix A
Table A1. Friend- and stranger-related trials did not differ significantly on performance nor did they
interact with emotional conditions.
Performance Condition F df p
Accuracy All 0.30 4,79 0.878
Happy 0.06 1,82 0.809
Neutral 0.15 1,82 0.698
Sad 0.24 1,82 0.628
Line 0.72 1,82 0.399
Reaction Time All 2.17 4,79 0.081
Happy 1.25 1,82 0.266
Neutral 0.01 1,82 0.925
Sad 0.61 1,82 0.437
Line 0.34 1,82 0.562
Note. MANCOVA analysis comparing “friend” and “stranger” responses. F = Wilks’ Lambda, df = degrees
of freedom.
Table A2. Control condition (line) was similar to sad condition and significantly dissimilar to
happy condition.
Performance Condition M SD MeanDifference t df p
Accuracy (%) Line 0.795 0.127
Happy 0.808 0.124 −0.013 −1.34 83 0.184
Neutral 0.803 0.124 −0.008 −0.89 83 0.374
Sad 0.796 0.114 <−0.001 −0.08 83 0.933
Reaction Time (ms) Line 723.8 88
Happy 706.3 87.1 17.5 3.19 83 0.002 **
Neutral 714.9 88 8.9 1.67 83 0.099
Sad 723.2 81.8 0.6 0.1 83 0.919
Note. Paired samples t-test comparing the line condition to all other emotional conditions. M = mean,
SD = standard deviation, t = Student’s statistic t between emotional and line conditions, df = degrees of freedom,
** p < 0.01.
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